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INTRODUCTION 
Drugs are bad. Well, maybe drugs are not all necessarily bad, as many 
have widely recognized scientific and medical benefits.1 The harmful 
  
 1. See Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs pmbl., opened for signature Mar. 
30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 151, as amended by Protocol Amending the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, opened for signature Mar. 25, 1972, 26 
U.S.T. 1439, 976 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1961 Convention]; Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances pmbl., Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter 1971 
Convention]. 
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health effects and addictions caused by drug abuse, however, are 
certainly bad. The word “drugs,” as used in this Article, refers to narcotic 
and psychotropic substances.2 Advertisements by public service 
campaigns frequently advise people not to do drugs.3 Children are told 
not to do drugs through anti-drug education programs in schools.4 Of 
course, it is easy to just advise people not to do drugs; but simply 
educating about the harmful effects of drugs does not always deter drug 
abuse.5 Many people are exposed to certain factors and pressures in their 
lives that can push them to abuse drugs despite knowing the potential 
health risks.6 Other people may choose to abuse drugs simply because 
they enjoy getting high, and do not particularly care about the effect it 
may have on their health. 
  
 2. Although the term “narcotic” has a literal meaning of “inducing stupor or 
sleep,” in this context the term covers those substances designated as “drugs” under the 
1961 Convention “whether or not they induce sleep or stupor.” U.N., COMMENTARY ON 
THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961, at 9–10, U.N. Sales No. E.73.XI.1 
(1973). A “psychotropic substance” refers to “any substance that ‘has the capacity to 
produce: 1) A state of dependence, and 2) Central nervous system stimulation or 
depression[,] resulting in hallucinations or disturbances in motor function or thinking or 
behavior or perception or mood,’ or similar abuse and ill effects as a” substance 
previously designated as a “psychotropic substance” under the 1971 Convention. Brian 
A. Ford, From Mountains to Molehills: A Comparative Analysis of Drug Policy, 19 ANN. 
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 197, 204 (2013) (quoting 1971 Convention, supra note 1, art. 2). 
 3. See About Us, P’SHIP FOR DRUG-FREE KIDS, 
http://www.drugfree.org/about/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015) (stating that anti-
drug public service announcements by the Partnership for Drug-Free Kids (formerly 
known as the Partnership for a Drug-Free America) “make up the largest single-issue 
public service campaign in advertising history”). 
 4. Such programs include the US-based DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance 
Education) program, which was implemented in public schools across the US and has had 
no demonstrated effectiveness in reducing drug abuse. A REPORT ON GLOBAL ILLICIT 
DRUG MARKETS 1998–2007, at 13 (Peter Reuter & Franz Trautmann eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG MARKETS 1998–2007], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/anti-drugs/files/report-drug-markets-short_en.pdf. 
 5. See REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2004, ¶ 
8, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2004/1, U.N. Sales No. E.05.XI.3 (2005) [hereinafter INCB 
REPORT 2004]. 
 6. See REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2014, ¶ 
25, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2014/1, U.N. Sales No. E.15.XI.1 (2015) (discussing 
socioeconomic factors that have an impact on the demand for illicit drugs). 
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Drug abuse is a global issue that transcends cultures and political 
boundaries.7 As a result of this pervasive problem, every country in the 
world has adopted some sort of drug-control law.8 Generally, the purpose 
of these laws is to protect people against the detrimental health effects of 
potentially harmful substances.9 During the second-half of the twentieth 
century, three UN conventions on drug policy were created to form an 
international strategy against the global drug problem.10 Almost every 
Member State of the UN has pledged their commitment to addressing the 
problem by signing the three UN Drug Conventions.11 Most countries 
have interpreted the treaties to prohibit any non-medical or non-scientific 
use of drugs, and to require criminal sanctions to punish any person 
found possessing or using drugs for any non-medical or non-scientific 
purpose, including for personal consumption.12 
However, despite governmental actions, drug-related problems 
continue to persist throughout the world. According to a report by the 
UN, it was estimated that in 2013 there were about 27.4 million people 
worldwide with drug abuse problems,13 and somewhere between 98,000 
and 231,400 drug-related deaths.14 Moreover, it was estimated that 1.65 
million (about 13.5% of) people who took drugs by injection had HIV.15 
Drug-related crimes continue to increase, even while other types of 
  
 7. See id. ¶¶ 269–684 (analyzing drug problems affecting various regions of the 
world). 
 8. Harry G. Levine, Commentary, Global Drug Prohibition: Its Uses and 
Crises, 14 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 143, 145 (2003). 
 9. See, e.g., Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1970). 
 10. See Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter 1988 Convention]; 1971 
Convention, supra note 1; 1961 Convention, supra note 1.  
 11. See Ford, supra note 2, at 201 n.10. 
 12. See Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes, Overcoming Obstacles to Reform? Making and 
Shaping Drug Policy in Contemporary Portugal and Australia 36 (Oct. 2006) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Melbourne) (on file with Minerva Access, 
University of Melbourne), available at https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/bitstream/ 
handle/11343/39229/67255_00003215_01_Caitlin_Hughes_Thesis.pdf?sequence=1. 
 13. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2015, at ix, U.N. 
Sales No. E.15.XI.6 (2015) [hereinafter UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 2015]. 
 14. Id. at 11. 
 15. Id. at ix. 
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crime, including property-related and violent crimes, have declined.16 
These trends have led many commentators and government officials to 
conclude that drug laws have been a complete failure.17 
Among all of the disappointing figures, however, lies a glimmer of 
hope; a beacon of light shining from a place that has struggled with the 
darkest problems stemming from drug abuse. There is a country that had 
lost faith in the effectiveness of the typical modern drug regime and took 
a path that many had seen as counter-intuitive.18 Rather than following 
the status quo of trying to deter drug abuse through the threat of criminal 
penalties, a nation suffering from high rates of drug addiction and HIV 
decided to take a more sympathetic approach towards its citizens.19 This 
country, located on the southwest tip of Europe, has caught the attention 
of observers from around the world with its unconventional method of 
dealing with illegal drug use. In 2001, Portugal implemented a 
revolutionary approach to the drug crisis by decriminalizing the 
possession of illegal drugs for personal use,20 and, over a decade later, 
the decriminalization scheme has proven to be impressively successful.21 
What can the rest of the world learn from Portugal’s experience? 
Drug policies that are more effective in reducing harms caused by illicit 
  
 16. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2014, at xii, 19, U.N. 
Sales No. E.14.XI.7 (2014) [hereinafter UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 2014]. 
 17. Matthew S. Jenner, Note, International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem 
with a Domestic Solution, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 901, 909 (2011). 
 18. See Maia Szalavitz, Drugs in Portugal: Did Decriminalization Work?, TIME 
(Apr. 26, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1893946,00.html. 
 19. See Kellen Russoniello, Note, The Devil (and Drugs) in the Details: 
Portugal’s Focus on Public Health as a Model for Decriminalization of Drugs in Mexico, 
12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 371, 380–85 (2012). 
 20. Decreto-Lei 30/2000 [Decree Law 30/2000], Diário da República de 
29.11.2000 (Port.) [hereinafter Decreto-Lei 30/2000]; see also EUR. MONITORING CTR. 
FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION, DRUG POLICY PROFILES: PORTUGAL 16–17 (2011) 
[hereinafter DRUG POLICY PROFILES: PORTUGAL], available at  
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/642/PolicyProfile_Portugal_WE
B_Final_289201.pdf. 
 21. See EU COMM., THE EU DRUGS STRATEGY, 2010–12, H.L. 270, ¶ 117 (U.K.), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/ 
docs/united_kingdom/own_initiative/oi_eu_drugs_strategy/oi_eu_drugs_strategy_lords_o
pinion_en.pdf. 
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drug use and addiction may differ from the international norm. In order 
to encourage countries to adopt more effective drug policies, 
international law should permit countries to pursue creative approaches 
that may include removing the threat of criminal prosecution for drug 
offenses. Countries should be allowed to focus efforts on reducing drug 
addiction through treatment, rehabilitation, and social reintegration. 
This Article focuses mainly on policies regarding drug use and 
possession for personal consumption. These will often be referred to 
throughout this Article as “minor drug offenses.” Other drug policy 
subjects, such as trafficking and distributing, are not particularly 
considered here. This Article also does not discuss the legalization of 
minor drug offenses. Rather, the focus of this Article is on Portugal’s 
success with decriminalization, how it fits within the current 
international legal framework for drug control, and whether changes 
should be made to current international law in order to better 
accommodate decriminalization policies. Section I of this Article 
discusses the current international drug regime by examining the three 
drug-related UN treaties and their effectiveness in combatting the global 
drug problem. Section II explains Portugal’s unique drug policy and 
analyzes its effectiveness. Section III discusses decriminalization in the 
international context and argues for a change in the current international 
drug control policy. 
I. INTERNATIONAL DRUG LAW 
Three UN treaties comprise the international drug policy framework: 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (often 
referred to collectively as “the UN Drug Conventions”).22 Nearly every 
  
 22. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
CONVENTIONS, at 1, U.N. Sales No. E.09.XI.20 (2009). See Treaties, U.N. OFFICE ON 
DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2016), for 
the text of the three treaties online. 
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country in the world is a Party to at least one of these treaties.23 These 
three treaties are the foundation of an international drug regime that calls 
for criminal penalties to punish drug offenses including possession.24 
This section of the Article focuses on international law regarding 
drug-control. Part A will present the general history and background of 
the UN Drug Conventions that currently govern international drug 
policy. Part B details the penal provisions of the treaties dealing with 
drug possession. Part C of this section discusses the effectiveness of the 
current international drug regime. 
A. History and Background of the Treaties 
The current international drug control scheme began with the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 (1961 Convention),25 which 
replaced previous international treaties on drug policy.26 The Preamble of 
the 1961 Convention provides that Parties recognize “that addiction to 
narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught 
with social and economic danger to mankind,” and that the Parties have a 
“duty to prevent and combat this evil.”27 Over a hundred different 
substances are subject to controls under the 1961 Convention,28 with 
opium, cocaine, and marijuana receiving the most restrictions.29 The 
drugs that come under the control of the 1961 Convention are 
categorized into four different “Schedules” on the basis of how addictive 
  
 23. See UN Conventions on Drug Control, INT’L DRUG POLICY CONSORTIUM, 
http://idpc.net/policy-advocacy/global-advocacy/global-drug-control-system/un-
conventions-drug-control (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). There are 193 member States of 
the UN. Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945–Present, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). Of those, 184 
are Parties to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. UN Conventions on 
Drug Control, supra. One hundred eighty-three are Parties to the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances of 1971. Id. One hundred eighty-nine are Parties to the 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Id. 
 24. See Ford, supra note 2, at 201. 
 25. See id. at 203. 
 26. 1961 Convention, supra note 1, art. 44. 
 27. Id. pmbl. 
 28. Id. scheds. I–IV. 
 29. Id. art. 2. 
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the substance is perceived to be.30 The aim of the 1961 Convention is to 
limit the use of the identified drugs to medical and scientific purposes.31 
To meet this goal, the 1961 Convention places an obligation on Parties to 
adopt legislative and administrative measures necessary “to limit 
exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, 
manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession 
of drugs.”32 
The main strategy of the 1961 Convention has been described as a 
“supply-side” approach towards disrupting the international drug trade.33 
This approach focuses on targeting suppliers of narcotics in order to keep 
the drugs from being available on the international market.34 It does this 
by requiring Parties to create state-controlled monopolies on the 
production and trade of narcotic drugs.35 However, even though the main 
strategy of the 1961 Convention is to control the supplies of narcotics, 
the Convention also seeks to deter consumer demand by requiring Parties 
to treat “possession” as a punishable offense.36 This prohibition on 
“possession” will be further discussed in the following subsection. 
In order for a narcotic drug to come under the control of the 1961 
Convention, both the World Health Organization (WHO) and the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (Commission) must take action.37 The 
WHO determines whether a substance is potentially dangerous and prone 
to abuse, and then makes a recommendation to the Commission if it 
determines that the substance should be listed in one of the schedules.38 
The Commission may choose whether or not to implement the 
recommendation of the WHO.39 
  
 30. Daniel Heilmann, The International Control of Illegal Drugs and the U.N. 
Treaty Regime: Preventing or Causing Human Rights Violations?, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 237, 244 (2011). 
 31. 1961 Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. 
 32. Id. art. 4(c). 
 33. Ford, supra note 2, at 203. 
 34. See id. 
 35. 1961 Convention, supra note 1, arts. 29–31. 
 36. Id. arts. 33, 36. 
 37. Id. art. 3. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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In the years following the creation of the 1961 Convention, technical 
advances in manufacturing led to an increase in the production and use of 
synthetic drugs and chemically produced psychotropics.40 This resulted 
in new mass global markets for substances such as amphetamines, 
barbiturates, and hallucinogens.41 Because the 1961 Convention did not 
contemplate psychotropic drugs, the Commission was unable to conclude 
that the treaty was applicable to these substances.42 The international 
community, however, believed that these drugs should be placed under 
controls similar to those provided in the 1961 Convention.43 
The Commission responded by drafting the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances of 1971 (1971 Convention).44 The 1971 
Convention is similar to the 1961 Convention in that it prohibits the 
manufacture, production, trade, possession, and use of covered 
substances for non-scientific and non-medical purposes.45 However, the 
1971 Convention gives the Commission greater discretion in determining 
which substances should be controlled.46 Together these treaties created a 
general prohibition over a broad range of drugs for any purpose other 
than medical or scientific use.47 
In the early 1980s, despite the controls implemented in the 1961 and 
1971 Conventions, “drug abuse and illicit traffic had reached 
unprecedented dimensions.”48 The UN General Assembly responded by 
  
 40. Julia Buxton, The Historical Foundations of the Narcotic Drug Control 
Regime, 23 (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4553, 2008). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See E.S.C. Res. 1969/1401 (XLVI), U.N. Doc. E/RES/1969/1401 (XLVI) 
(June 5, 1969). 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id.; 1971 Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. 
 45. Compare 1971 Convention, supra note 1, arts. 5, 7 (limiting the use of 
substances covered by the Convention to medical and scientific purposes), with 1961 
Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(c) (obligating Parties “to limit exclusively to medical and 
scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, 
use and possession of drugs”). 
 46. See Heilmann, supra note 30, at 247. 
 47. See 1961 Convention, supra note 1, arts. 2, 4, 36; 1971 Convention, supra 
note 1, arts. 2, 5, 7, 22. 
 48. U.N., COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT 
TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES 1988, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
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recommending that the Commission draft a new convention.49 The 
Commission’s efforts resulted in the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 
(1988 Convention).50 The 1988 Convention reinforced the controls laid 
down in the previous Conventions by requiring tougher penalties, 
including the criminalization of drug use and possession.51 The 1988 
Convention expands the UN’s drug control strategy by emphasizing a 
demand-side approach in addition to the supply-side approach taken by 
the previous conventions.52 Together, the 1961 Convention, the 1971 
Convention, and the 1988 Convention have reigned as the foundation of 
international drug policy for over two-and-a-half decades. 
B. Penal Provisions for Possession 
All three of the UN Drug Conventions prohibit the possession of 
drugs, and each contains provisions regarding penalties for violations. 
Article 33 of the 1961 Convention requires the Parties to prohibit “the 
possession of drugs except under legal authority.”53 Article 36(1)(a) of 
the 1961 Convention goes on to list “possession” as one of several 
actions that Parties are required to “ensure . . . shall be punishable 
offences when committed intentionally, and that serious offences shall be 
liable to adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other 
  
E/CN.7/590, U.N. Sales No. E.98.XI.5 (1988) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE 1988 
CONVENTION]. 
 49. See Draft Convention Against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances and Related Activities, G.A. Res. 39/141, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/141 (Dec. 14, 
1984). 
 50. See 1988 Convention, supra note 10, pmbl. 
 51. See id. art. 3. The penalty provisions are discussed further in Section I.B. of 
this Article. 
 52. David P. Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The UN Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 DENV. J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 387, 402–03 (1990). See also 1988 Convention, supra note 10, pmbl. Article 
14 requires Parties to take “measures aimed at eliminating or reducing illicit demand for 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.” Id. art. 14(4). Most importantly for 
purposes of this discussion, the 1988 Convention also aims to reduce demand by 
criminalizing “possession, purchase or cultivation” for personal use. Id. art. 3(2). 
 53. 1961 Convention, supra note 1, art. 33. 
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penalties of deprivation of liberty.”54 However, the 1961 Convention was 
amended in 1972 by a Protocol that added sub-paragraph (1)(b),55 which 
provides that “when abusers of drugs have committed such offences, the 
Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment 
or in addition to conviction or punishment, that such abusers shall 
undergo measures of treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and 
social reintegration in conformity with paragraph 1 of article 38.”56 The 
first paragraph of article 38 requires Parties to “give special attention to 
and take all practicable measures for the prevention of abuse of drugs 
and for the early identification, treatment, education, after-care, 
rehabilitation and social reintegration of the persons involved and shall 
co-ordinate their efforts to these ends.”57 The penal provisions in the 
1971 Convention are identical to those in the 1961 Convention.58 
These provisions require Parties not to legally permit the possession 
of controlled substances (for non-medical and non-scientific purposes). 
But, because treatment, rehabilitation, and other similar actions, may be 
used as alternatives to punishment under these provisions, the 1961 and 
1971 Conventions do not necessarily require that possession by drug 
abusers be treated as a criminal offense.59 
The 1988 Convention takes a stronger stance against possession of 
controlled substances.60 Article 3(2) of the 1988 Convention provides: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 54. Id. art. 36. 
 55. 1961 Convention, supra note 1, art. 14(1)(b).  
 56. Id. art. 36(1)(b). 
 57. Id. art. 38(1). 
 58. See 1971 Convention, supra note 1, arts. 20, 22. 
 59. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 379 n.23. 
 60. See 1988 Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(2). 
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Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal 
system, each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to 
establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed 
intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs 
or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the 
provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or 
the 1971 Convention.61 
This language has been interpreted as “clearly requir[ing] parties to 
criminalize” possession of drugs for personal consumption, rather than 
treating such an act merely as a “punishable offence” as required by the 
previous conventions.62 Obligating Parties to treat possession for 
personal consumption as a criminal offense is significant because it 
causes the Parties’ criminal justice systems to be responsible for handling 
cases of minor drug offenses.63 Problems arising from the language of 
article 3(2) will be discussed in further detail below. 
Although article 3(2) obligates Parties to treat possession as a criminal 
offense, article 3(4)(d) allows Parties to “provide, either as an alternative 
to conviction or punishment, or in addition to conviction or punishment 
of an offence established in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, 
measures for the treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation or social 
reintegration of the offender.”64 Therefore, Parties are still permitted, as 
they were under the 1961 and 1971 Conventions, to utilize methods other 
than incarceration to deal with those caught in possession of controlled 
substances for personal use.65 Parties are also permitted to use more strict 
measures than those required by the conventions.66 
  
 61. See id. 
 62. Although there is an exception for countries, “it would be contrary to the 
constitutional principles and basic concepts of their legal systems to [‘criminalize such 
acts’].” COMMENTARY ON THE 1988 CONVENTION, supra note 48, at 82–83. 
 63. See id. at 82, 87 (suggesting that alternatives to conviction or punishment 
stated in art. 3(4)(d) are “bridges between the criminal justice system and the treatment 
system[,]” and they take place within the “criminal process”). 
 64. 1988 Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(4)(d). 
 65. COMMENTARY ON THE 1988 CONVENTION, supra note 48, at 86. 
 66. 1988 Convention, supra note 10, art. 24; 1971 Convention, supra note 1, art. 
23; 1961 Convention, supra note 1, art. 39. 
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C. The International Prohibitionist Policy and its Effectiveness 
Most Parties to the UN Drug Conventions, including the U.S., have 
complied with the provisions by enacting drug policies that punish the 
possession of controlled substances with criminal penalties.67 This model 
of drug control has been referred to as the “prohibitionist approach.”68 
The UN Drug Conventions are most commonly interpreted to require the 
prohibitionist model of drug control, which has become a familiar and 
accepted norm of international law.69 The prohibitionist approach can be 
understood as utilizing a coercive strategy to target both the supply-side 
and the demand-side of the illegal drug market.70 On the supply side, this 
approach places strict criminal penalties, particularly incarceration, on 
those who manufacture, produce, traffic, and sell controlled substances.71 
On the demand side, the approach seeks to deter customers of the illegal 
drug market by imposing criminal penalties on those caught purchasing 
or in possession of controlled substances.72 In most countries, a majority 
of drug-related arrests are for the possession of controlled substances.73 
The prohibitionist model reflects a simplified interpretation and 
imposition of the Parties’ obligations under the conventions. Rather than 
provide for alternatives, such as those listed in article 3(4)(d) of the 1988 
Convention, prohibitionist regimes subject offenders to the criminal 
justice system and treat such offenders like any other type of criminal.74 
This approach fails to recognize drug addicts as people with a mental 
health problem and also fails to distinguish drug addicts from other 
criminals.75 Thus, criminal justice systems often impose criminal 
  
 67. See Ford, supra note 2, at 201. 
 68. Id. at 200. 
 69. See id. at 202. 
 70. See id. at 205. 
 71. See id. at 201. 
 72. See id. These penalties are also imposed on those caught cultivating drugs for 
personal consumption (for example: growing a marijuana plant or opium poppies). 1988 
Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(2). 
 73. GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG MARKETS 1998–2007, supra note 4, at 44. 
 74. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2010). 
 75. See UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 13 (“The lack of 
access to and availability of health care, especially drug dependence treatment and HIV 
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sanctions for offenses such as illegal drug possession but rarely provide 
the type of adequate treatment or rehabilitation that would help the 
offender overcome an addiction.76 
The prevailing prohibitionist drug regime has been relatively 
ineffective in combatting issues of drug use and drug addiction.77 By 
1998, a decade after the creation of the 1988 Convention, the 
international community acknowledged the growing global drug abuse 
problem.78 The UN General Assembly restated its commitment to 
tackling the global drug problem in the 1998 UN General Assembly 
Special Session (UNGASS) Political Declaration.79 The UNGASS 
envisioned 2008 as a target date to reach several drug-related goals, 
including demand reduction.80 However, little had changed with the 
global drug problem by 2008.81 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) stated in 
its 2008 World Drug Report that the international drug regime had an 
unintended consequence in “the way the authorities perceive and deal 
with the users of illicit drugs.”82 The UNODC described this unintended 
consequence as “[a] system . . . in which those who fall into the web of 
  
prevention and care services, in prisons is of major concern . . . .”); Heilmann, supra note 
30, at 268 n.164 (“An additional problem . . . is that the framing of the narcotics problem 
as an issue of criminality instead of public health, and the application of ‘zero tolerance’ 
policies obviously make the use of regulatory tools like cost-benefit analysis difficult.”); 
supra text accompanying note 72. 
 76. See UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 11–13; Comm’n. 
on Narcotic Drugs, U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Political Declaration and Plan of 
Action on International Cooperation Towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to 
Counter the World Drug Problem, at 23, Mar. 11–12, 2009, (Sept. 2009) [hereinafter 
2009 Political Declaration], available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/ 
V0984963-English.pdf. 
 77. See 2009 Political Declaration, supra note 76, at 2; Declaration on the 
Guiding Principles of Drug Demand Reduction, G.A. Res. A/S-20/4, U.N. GAOR, 20th 
Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/S-20/4, (June 10, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 
Declaration].  
 78. See 1998 Declaration, supra note 77, ¶ 3. 
 79. Id. ¶ 7(a)–(d). 
 80. Heilmann, supra note 30, at 252. 
 81. Ford, supra note 2, at 205. 
 82. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2008, at 216, U.N. 
Sales No. E.08.XI.1 (2008) [hereinafter UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 2008]. 
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addiction find themselves excluded and marginalized from the social 
mainstream, tainted with a moral stigma, and often unable to find 
treatment even when motivated to seek it.”83 This flaw is the direct result 
of the strict prohibitionist approach to drug policy, as the criminal nature 
of drug use perpetuates the stigma associated with drug addiction.84 
Furthermore, those who are incarcerated for drug offenses have limited 
options for treating their drug addiction.85 
The UNODC World Drug Reports for recent years show that the 
current international drug-control regime continues to have little effect 
on reducing the amount of drug use worldwide.86 “According to the most 
recent data available,” the 2015 report concludes, “there has been little 
change in the overall global situation regarding the production, use and 
health consequences of illicit drugs.”87 The 2014 report states, “overall 
the global situation with regard to the prevalence of illicit drug use and 
problem drug use is generally stable, with the total global number of 
drug users increasingly commensurate with the growth of the world 
population.”88 While the number of illicit drug users relative to the total 
world population remained fairly stable during the period between 2003 
and 2012, “the rate of persons arrested for or suspected of offences 
related to possession for personal use increased by 18 per cent.”89 
Many of the world’s prisoners are incarcerated for offenses related to 
the use or possession of drugs. However, incarceration often exacerbates 
problems associated with drug addiction.90 “[T]he prison environment is 
one in which there are limited prevention and treatment options for 
dealing with drug dependence and its associated health consequences.”91 
There is a high rate of HIV infections among prisoners, and there is also 
  
 83. Id. 
 84. GLEN GREENWALD, DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL: LESSONS FOR 
CREATING FAIR AND SUCCESSFUL DRUG POLICIES 9 (2009). 
 85. UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 2015, supra note 13, at 76. 
 86. See id. at 1; UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at ix. 
 87. UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 2015, supra note 13, at ix. 
 88. UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at ix. 
 89. Id. at 19. 
 90. Id. at 11–13. 
 91. Id. at 13. 
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a high prevalence of drug use among prison populations.92 It is common 
for prisoners to take drugs by injection, which likely contributes to the 
high rate of HIV infections since prisoners have limited access to clean 
needles.93 
The evidence presented here suggests that the prevailing prohibitionist 
international drug-control regime is failing to address the public health 
issues for which drug policies are intended to resolve. The next section 
explores Portugal’s experience with a different type of drug policy, 
which has focused more on public health concerns and has succeeded in 
many respects where prohibitionist policies have failed. 
II. PORTUGAL’S EXPERIMENT: THE PUBLIC-HEALTH APPROACH 
In 2001, Portugal decided to take a unique and creative approach to 
drug policy, and decriminalized the possession of small quantities of 
illicit drugs.94 This section focuses on Portugal’s unique 
decriminalization policy. Part A delves into Portugal’s history with drugs 
leading up to its decision to enact the decriminalization scheme. Part B 
details the enactment and framework of Portugal’s drug law. Part C 
examines the effects of Portugal’s drug policy. 
A. Portugal’s History with Drugs and Drug Laws 
Portugal’s drug laws and its stance on drug use and possession have 
changed several times over the past several decades. In 1926, a 
totalitarian government came to power in Portugal.95 During most of the 
totalitarian rule, drug trafficking and possession were crimes, but drug 
use was not a criminal offense.96 Portugal criminalized drug use in 1970 
  
 92. Id. at 11–13. 
 93. Id. at 13. 
 94. Drug Policy Profiles: Portugal, supra note 20, at 16–17; see also Decreto-
Lei 30/2000, supra note 20. 
 95. INEKE VAN BEUSEKOM ET AL., RAND EUR., GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING 
AND EVALUATING THE PORTUGUESE DRUG STRATEGY 7 (2002). 
 96. Id. 
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with the passage of Decreto-Lei No. 420/70 (“Decree Law No. 
420/70”).97 
After a democratic revolution in 1974, illegal drug use suddenly 
became a growing problem in Portugal.98 Despite government anti-drug 
campaigns and the creation of governmental organizations tasked with 
reducing drug use, the problem continued to grow.99 Due in part to 
Portugal’s location on the Southwest tip of Europe, the country became 
an attractive point for illegal drugs to enter the continent.100 
In the 1990s, heroin use quickly became a significant problem for 
Portugal.101 During this period, “the negative consequences of drug use 
became visible: heroin abuse started a social and human degradation 
process, involving increasing criminality, health problems of heroin 
addicts, and feelings of insecurity among the general population.”102 By 
1997, heroin users comprised 95.4% of all drug users seeking treatment 
in Portugal.103 According to the European Monitoring Center on Drugs 
and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) the number of drug-related AIDS cases 
in Portugal rose from 0.1 per million people in 1985, to 54.7 per million 
in 1998.104 By 1999, Portugal had the highest rate of injection drug-
related AIDS cases in the European Union and the second-highest 
prevalence of injection drug users with HIV.105 In 2000, 14% of drug 
users who entered public drug treatment had HIV.106 Arrests for drug 
offenses had risen by 235% from 1990 to 1998, with most of the arrests 
related to heroin.107 In 2000, Portugal’s enforcement of drug laws cost 
over 100 million euros.108 
  
 97. Decreto-Lei 420/70 [Decree Law 420/70], Diário da República de 3.9.1970 
(Port.); DRUG POLICY PROFILES: PORTUGAL, supra note 20, at 10. 
 98. VAN BEUSEKOM ET AL., supra note 95, at 7. 
 99. Id. at 7–8. 
 100. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 380–81. 
 101. Id. at 381–82. 
 102. VAN BEUSEKOM ET AL., supra note 95, at 8. 
 103. Mirjam van het Loo et al., Decriminalization of Drug Use in Portugal: The 
Development of a Policy, 582 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 49, 54 (2002). 
 104. Id. at 52. 
 105. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 382. 
 106. Id. 
 107. VAN BEUSEKOM ET AL., supra note 95, at 11. 
 108. Id. at xiii. 
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Estimates suggest that by the end of the 1990s there were between 
50,000 and 100,000 drug addicts in Portugal, which had a total 
population of about 10 million, meaning that somewhere between 0.5 
and 1% of the country’s population suffered from drug addiction.109 By 
the end of the 1990s, increasing public anxiety “culminated in the drugs 
issue becoming the ‘number one concern’ of Portuguese society.”110 With 
the harmful effects of drug abuse becoming more and more prevalent, the 
public realized that the traditional law enforcement and treatment tactics 
were “inadequate responses.”111 What emerged was a “paradigmatic shift 
in the conceptualisation of drug users—to see drug users as citizens who 
were sick—not criminals.”112 The shifting societal view and the failure of 
criminal penalties to deter drug use signaled that the time had come for a 
new approach to the drug crisis. 
B. Portugal’s Decriminalization Strategy (Decreto-Lei 30/2000) 
To address the out-of-control drug crisis, the Portuguese government 
created the Comissão para a Estratégia Nacional de Combate à Droga 
(“Commission for a National Drug Strategy,” hereinafter CNDS) to 
consider potential solutions.113 The CNDS recommended a long-term 
strategy “based on prevention, harm reduction and the reintegration of 
drug users into society.”114 In response, the Portuguese government 
began work on crafting a new drug policy that would incorporate those 
principles.115 The driving idea behind the law was that drug addiction 
  
 109. Id. at 10. 
 110. Hughes, supra note 12, at 103. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 384; see also LAURENCE ALLEN ET AL., DRUG 
POLICY PROGRAMME, DECRIMINALISATION OF DRUGS IN PORTUGAL: A CURRENT 
OVERVIEW 2 (2004) (discussing the rise of the Portuguese legal framework and current 
drug use commissions like the Comissões para a Dissuasão da Toxicodependência 
(Commissions for the Dissuasion of Drug Use)). 
 114. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 113, at 2. 
 115. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 384. 
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should be treated as a social or public health issue, rather than a criminal 
issue.116 
On October 19, 2000, the Parliament adopted Portugal’s current law 
on drug possession, Decreto-Lei 30/2000 (“Decree Law 30/2000”), 
which went into effect on July 1, 2001.117 The new law decriminalized 
the possession of illegal substances for personal use of amounts not 
exceeding what the law considered to be a ten-day supply.118 An 
individual caught in possession of illegal substances of quantities under a 
ten-day supply is not placed under arrest.119 Instead, the police refer the 
individual to a Comissõe para a Dissuasão da Toxicodependência 
(“Commission for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction,” hereinafter 
Dissuasion Committee) within 72 hours of the offense.120 The Dissuasion 
Committee is charged with determining whether the offender has a drug 
problem.121 
Each Dissuasion Committee is comprised of three people, each 
appointed by a Government official.122 One person “must be a legal 
expert appointed by the Ministry of Justice[;]” the other two, which may 
come “from the fields of medicine, psychology, sociology, social 
services, or other [related] areas where expertise in drug addiction may 
  
 116. João Castel-Branco Goulão, Decriminalizing Possession of All Illicit Drugs, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/03/17/ 
lowering-the-deadly-cost-of-drug-abuse/decriminalizing-possession-of-all-illicit-drugs. 
 117. Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, art. 29; see also DRUG POLICY 
PROFILES: PORTUGAL, supra note 20, at 16–17. 
 118. Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, art. 2. Criminal penalties are still 
available for people found selling, trafficking, or possessing large amounts of illegal 
drugs. See EU COMM., supra note 21, ¶ 107. 
 119. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 113, at 2. 
 120. Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, art. 5(1)–(2); see also ALLEN ET AL., 
supra note 113, at 2; DRUG POLICY PROFILES: PORTUGAL, supra note 20, at 16–17. 
 121. See generally Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20; see also DRUG POLICY 
PROFILES: PORTUGAL, supra note 20, at 16–17. 
 122. Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, art. 7. 
2016] Portuguese Defiance 743 
 
be found,” are appointed by the Ministry of Health.123 A therapist of the 
offender’s choosing also takes part in the proceedings.124 
If the Dissuasion Committee determines that the offender does not 
have a drug addiction, and the offender has no prior drug offenses, then 
the proceedings are provisionally suspended.125 If the Dissuasion 
Committee does determine that the offender is an addict, then the 
outcome can potentially be affected by whether the offender committed 
prior drug offenses.126 If the addict has not committed a prior offense, 
then the proceedings must be provisionally suspended if the addict 
voluntarily accepts to undergo treatment.127 However, if the addict has 
committed a prior drug offense, then it is within the Dissuasion 
Committee’s discretion whether to provisionally suspend the proceedings 
if the offender agrees to undergo treatment or to impose sanctions.128 
Proceedings may not be reopened if the offender completes treatment.129 
If an offender decides not to undergo treatment, or if the Dissuasion 
Committee decides against suspending the proceedings for an offender 
with prior offenses, then there are a wide variety of sanctions available 
that the committee may impose.130 Penalties for addicts can include: 
 
 
  
 123. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 386; see also Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 
20, art. 7. 
 124. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 387; Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, art. 
10. 
 125. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 387; Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, art. 
11(1). 
 126. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 387; Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, arts. 
10–15; infra text accompanying note 139. 
 127. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 387; Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, art. 
11(2). 
 128. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 387; Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, art. 
11(3). 
 129. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 387; Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, art. 
14. 
 130. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 387; Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, arts. 
15–17. 
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[I]neligibility for the practice of certain occupations requiring licenses; 
expulsion from certain places; prohibition on associating with certain 
people; restrictions on foreign travel; periodic presentation at a place 
indicated by the commission (usually for medical services); ineligibility 
for firearm licenses; seizure of objects that represent a risk to the 
consumer or the public or that would encourage the commission of a 
crime or other offense; termination of public benefits for subsidies or 
allowances; mandatory donation to a charitable organization; or 
required hours of community service.131 
Penalties for non-addicts can include a mere warning, or a fine in 
place of or in addition to any of the penalties available for addicts.132 The 
Dissuasion Committee uses its discretion and considers several factors to 
determine which penalties to apply.133 
C. The Results of Decriminalization 
The overall effects of the decriminalization scheme have been 
beneficial.134 In 2009, Glenn Greenwald of the Cato Institute published a 
report on his findings on the effects of the decriminalized drug policy in 
Portugal, which reflected surprisingly positive results.135 “In almost every 
category of drug, and for drug usage overall, the lifetime prevalence rates 
in the predecriminalization era of the 1990s were higher than the post-
decriminalization rates.”136 However, the most important benefit to come 
from decriminalization has been the decrease in drug-related deaths. 
Between 1999 and 2006, there was a more than 25% decrease in the total 
number of drug-related deaths.137 Furthermore, between 2000 and 2006, 
the total number of deaths caused by opiates (which includes heroin) was 
  
 131. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 387 (citing Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 
20, art. 17(2)–(3)). 
 132. Id. at 386–88 (citing Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, arts. 15(1), 16(1)). 
 133. Id. at 388 (citing Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, art. 15(4)). 
 134. See GREENWALD, supra note 84, at 1 (“[J]udged by virtually every metric, the 
Portuguese decriminalization framework has been a resounding success.”); Goulão, supra 
note 116. 
 135. GREENWALD, supra note 84, at 1. 
 136. Id. at 14–15. 
 137. Id. at 17. 
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cut by more than half.138 Additionally, “the number of people in 
substitution treatment leapt from 6,040 in 1999 to 14,877 in 2003, an 
increase of 147%.”139 
More recent reports confirm the continuing success of Portugal’s drug 
policy.140 Studies estimate that the number of Portugal’s problem drug 
users decreased by 50% from the early 1990s, when the number was 
about 100,000, to 2012, when the number had dropped to 50,000.141 
Estimates also suggest that the number of injecting drug users decreased 
more than 40% during that time period.142 The total number of drug users 
in treatment increased more than 60%, from 23,654 in 1998 to 38,532 in 
2008.143 The annual number of new cases of HIV decreased between 
2000 and 2008 from 907 to 267.144 
João Castel-Branco Goulão, Portugal’s national drug coordinator and 
the chairman of the European Monitoring Center on Drugs and Drug 
Addiction, professed his pride in the success of his country’s drug policy 
by writing in the New York Times that, “[w]hile critics of the law 
warned that drug use would swell, it has not risen. We have seen 
significant reduction in H.I.V. infections and in overdoses, as well as a 
substantial increase in new patients seeking drug treatment.”145 He 
  
 138. Id. 
 139. CAITLIN HUGHES & ALEX STEVENS, THE EFFECTS OF DECRIMINALIZATION OF 
DRUG USE IN PORTUGAL 2 (2007). Substitution treatment “supplies illicit drug users with 
a replacement drug, a prescribed medicine such as methadone or buprenorphine, which is 
usually administered orally in a supervised clinical setting.” Michelle Kermode et al., 
Opioid Substitution Therapy in Resource-Poor Settings, 89 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
243, 243. Substitution treatment is “effective in substantially reducing illicit opiate use, 
HIV risk behaviours, death from overdose and criminal activity, and financial and other 
stresses on drug users and their families.” Id. 
 140. See ARI ROSMARIN & NIAMH EASTWOOD, RELEASE, A QUIET REVOLUTION: 
DECRIMINALISATION POLICIES IN PRACTICE ACROSS THE GLOBE 28–30 (2012), 
http://www.release.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf/publications/Release_Quiet_Revolution_
2013.pdf. 
 141. Id. at 29. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes & Alex Stevens, What Can We Learn from the 
Portuguese Decriminalization of Illicit Drugs?, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 999, 1015 
(2010). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Goulão, supra note 116. 
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attributes the success to “the commissions’ outreach, treatment programs 
and measures to protect users’ health.”146  
Portugal’s former Prime Minister, José Sócrates, who was the 
architect of the decriminalization policy when he was deputy Prime 
Minister, has stated that the cost of the new policy has freed up a lot of 
time for the courts, as well as space in the prisons.147 He also has claimed 
that the costs of “the expansions made to the treatment system were far 
outweighed by the savings to the criminal justice system.”148 Many of the 
savings to the criminal justice system result from the large majority of 
proceedings that are suspended.149 
III. WHAT THE WORLD CAN LEARN FROM PORTUGAL’S EXPERIENCE 
Portugal’s success with Decreto-Lei 30/2000 indicates that there are 
more effective methods for furthering the underlying policies of the UN 
Drug Conventions than through the criminalization of drug use and 
possession for personal consumption. However, the plain language of the 
UN Drug Conventions requires drug possession to be a criminal 
offense.150 Even though the treaties allow Parties to use rehabilitative 
measures “as an alternative to conviction or punishment,”151 few 
countries have criminal justice systems that can adequately implement 
such measures effectively.152 Therefore, sufficient alternatives to 
prosecution and imprisonment remain limited.153 
The international community should respond to the positive results of 
the approach taken in Portugal by changing how drug possession is 
considered under international law. This section of the Article will 
  
 146. Id. 
 147. EU COMM., supra note 21, ¶ 115. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 390 (“Of the commission rulings, eighty-five 
percent suspended the proceeding; fourteen percent imposed a sanction, and one percent 
resulted in absolution.”). 
 150. See 1988 Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(2); 1971 Convention, supra note 
1, arts. 5, 7, 22; 1961 Convention, supra note 1, arts. 33, 36.  
 151. 1988 Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(4)(d). 
 152. See 2009 Political Declaration, supra note 76, at 23. 
 153. See id. 
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present how the international community should proceed. Part A of this 
section will explain why the international community should be 
permitted to move away from the criminalization of drug possession for 
personal use. Part B will discuss whether decriminalization is permitted 
under the current international framework. Part C will discuss how the 
1988 Convention’s penalty provisions should be amended. 
A. Should Countries Be Allowed to Move Away from the 
Criminalization of Drug Possession for Personal Use? 
As discussed in Section I.C. above, criminalizing drug possession has 
been ineffective in furthering the goals of the UN Drug Conventions. 
Yet, criminalized drug possession remains the prevailing drug-control 
strategy throughout the world.154 While arrests for possession of drugs 
for personal use have increased worldwide, so has the number of illicit 
drug users.155 The prevailing strategy is thus clearly failing to reduce the 
demand for controlled substances. 
The evidence shows that there are approaches to the drug problem 
other than criminalized prohibition that are more effective at reducing the 
harm of drug abuse.156 An increasing number of countries have 
implemented “harm reduction” reforms aimed at reducing the harm to 
individuals and society caused by drug abuse.157 Such reforms include 
providing clean needles and treatment for drug addicts and reducing 
enforcement against and criminal sanctions for drug possession.158 In 
  
 154. See Ford, supra note 2, at 201. 
 155. UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 2014, supra note 16, at 19 (using data 
collected for the years 2003–2012). 
 156. In addition to the positive results from Portugal’s drug scheme, the 
Netherlands has also experienced benefits from a strategy that uses prosecutorial 
discretion to refrain from prosecuting those found in possession of small amounts of 
drugs for personal use. For more information on the Dutch and other European drug 
strategies, see Harm Reduction Overview for Netherlands, EUR. MONITORING CENTRE 
FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION (June 3, 2015), http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/country-
data/harm-reduction/Netherlands. 
 157. GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG MARKETS 1998–2007, supra note 4, at 13. 
 158. The Netherlands and Switzerland, among others, “regard the enforcement of 
the criminal law as a last resort, aimed primarily at protecting the public from predatory 
and dangerous activities related to drug selling.” Id. 
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Europe, the benefits of these types of policies have been recognized by 
the EMCDDA and “[h]arm reduction as a concept is now accepted as 
part of a balanced approach.”159 Acknowledging that “[t]here are limited 
alternatives to prosecution and imprisonment for drug-using offenders, 
and treatment services within the criminal justice system are frequently 
inadequate,”160 the UNODC issued a Political Declaration in 2009 
requesting Parties to the UN Drug Conventions to “consider allowing the 
full implementation of drug dependence treatment and care options for 
offenders, in particular, when appropriate, providing treatment as an 
alternative to incarceration.”161 
Several countries have implemented drug policies that offer 
alternatives to mandatory incarceration for certain drug offenses.162 
Probably the most notable of such practices is the use of specialized 
“drug courts” in some countries, including the U.S., to handle drug 
offenses.163 Drug courts are organized under criminal justice systems in 
order to more effectively address problems posed by drug abuse and 
addiction.164 These courts often place offenders into drug treatment 
programs, which include intense monitoring and frequent drug testing.165 
If the participant is able to successfully complete the drug treatment 
program, the criminal charges are dismissed.166 But, if the participant 
fails to abstain from drug use, then he or she may face harsh penalties, 
  
 159. Wolfgang Götz, Foreword to EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & 
DRUG ADDICTION, HARM REDUCTION: EVIDENCE, IMPACTS AND CHALLENGES 7 (Tim 
Rhodes & Dagmar Hedrich eds., 2010). 
 160. 2009 Political Declaration, supra note 76, at 23. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See e.g., James L. Nolan, Jr., Harm Reduction and the American Difference: 
Drug Treatment and Problem-Solving Courts in Comparative Perspective, 13 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 31 (2010); Ford, supra note 2, at 216–22. 
 163. For a discussion on the “Problem-Solving” court movement see JAMES L. 
NOLAN, JR., LEGAL ACCENTS, LEGAL BORROWING: THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM-
SOLVING COURT MOVEMENT (2009). 
 164. Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the 
Twenty-First Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 
GA. L. REV. 717, 725 (2008). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 726. 
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such as fines, required community service, or jail time.167 These drug 
courts have been praised as being a more successful alternative to the 
traditional criminal courts for “turning addicts into drug free, productive 
citizens.”168 The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has 
encouraged countries to consider utilizing drug courts as an “option in 
addressing drug abuse and related problems.”169 
However, despite the benefits of providing alternatives to 
imprisonment, it is difficult to integrate harm reduction and treatment 
services with criminal justice systems.170 The EMCDDA has found that 
there are “tensions and contradictions inherent in providing harm 
reduction services (which may accept continued drug use) in criminal 
justice settings (that do not).”171 In a scientific monograph by the 
EMCDDA, two such contradictions are described: 1) “the fact that 
criminal justice systems themselves produce harms,” and 2) “the pursuit 
of abstinence and the acknowledgement of continuing drug use.”172 The 
first contradiction arises from the problems caused by an individual’s 
arrest or punishment,173 as well as the ineffectiveness of traditional 
criminal penalties in reducing drug crimes.174 The second contradiction is 
caused by the “difficult[y] for the [criminal justice] system to 
  
 167. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS 14 
(reprint 2004) (1997), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/ 
Contributions/Civil/Drug_Court_Professionals/Key_Components.pdf. 
 168. See Hora & Stalcup, supra note 164, at 765. 
 169. INCB REPORT 2004, supra note 5, ¶ 308. 
 170. See 2009 Political Declaration, supra note 76, at 23; Alex Stevens et al., 
Criminal Justice Approaches to Harm Reduction in Europe, in HARM REDUCTION: 
EVIDENCE, IMPACTS AND CHALLENGES, supra note 159, at 379, 379–82. 
 171. Stevens et al., supra note 170, at 379. 
 172. Id. at 380. 
 173. See Ford, supra note 2, at 209 (“An arrest record can lead to permanent 
problems such as finding employment, housing, financing for college, or admission to 
college.”). 
 174. Hora & Stalcup, supra note 164, at 719 (“The traditional criminal justice 
system . . . has been willing to arrest, adjudicate, and incarcerate drug abusers without 
regard to the incredibly high rates of recidivism in this population. Nearly seven in ten 
convicted drug offenders reoffends within three years of release from incarceration.”). 
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acknowledge that the people under its control continue to defy the 
law.”175 
Because drug courts are organized under criminal justice systems, 
their effectiveness could be affected by these contradictions, which may 
cause some jurisdictions to prefer a drug policy that is more similar to 
Portugal’s Decreto-Lei 30/2000. Unlike in Portugal, a person found in 
possession of a controlled substance is subject to arrest in jurisdictions 
that utilize drug courts.176 According to the U.S. Department of Justice, 
“[a]rrest can be a traumatic event in a person’s life. It creates an 
immediate crisis and can force substance abusing behavior into the 
open.”177 Even if there is no conviction, record of an arrest can lead to an 
individual “hav[ing] trouble finding jobs or housing, gaining admission 
to college, receiving college loans, and otherwise living productive 
lives.”178 Countries may wish to avoid imposing these problems on drug 
abusers (whose lives may already be troubled) by adopting policies that 
remove minor drug offenses from the criminal justice system, or 
otherwise do not permit arrests for minor drug offenses. 
Drug courts in the U.S. have been criticized for pursuing an 
unrealistic approach to drug treatment.179 U.S. drug courts not only 
expect participants to remain completely abstinent from drug use,180 but 
they usually expect participants to also refrain from consuming alcohol 
  
 175. Stevens et al., supra note 170, at 380. 
 176. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 167, at 5 (“The period immediately 
after an arrest, or after apprehension for a probation violation, provides a critical window 
of opportunity for intervening and introducing the value of [alcohol or other drug] 
treatment.”); Peggy F. Hora, A Dozen Years of Drug Treatment Courts: Uncovering Our 
Theoretical Foundation and the Construction of a Mainstream Paradigm, 37 SUBSTANCE 
USE & MISUSE 1469, 1473 (2002) (“[D]rug treatment courts use the defendant’s arrest as 
an opportunity for intervention.”). 
 177. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 167, at 5. 
 178. Stephen B. Duke, Cannabis Captiva: Freeing the World from Marijuana 
Prohibition, 11 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 83, 86 (2010). 
 179. Nolan, supra note 162, at 41 (“[A]t least as it concerns drug courts, the U.S. 
prefers a total abstinence or demand reduction approach, an orientation that practitioners 
in the other countries find unrealistic.”) (footnote omitted). 
 180. Id.; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 167, at 13 (“Although drug courts 
recognize that individuals have a tendency to relapse, continuing [drug] use is not 
condoned.”). 
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because “it is commonly recognized that alcohol use frequently 
contributes to relapse among individuals whose primary drug of choice is 
not alcohol.”181 Compliance is measured through frequent testing for 
alcohol and drugs,182 and if a participant tests positive for either alcohol 
or drugs, he or she may face penalties for noncompliance, which could 
include criminal conviction and jail time.183 The practice of requiring 
complete abstention from alcohol and drug use has not caught on with 
drug courts outside of the U.S., which often view a participant’s 
“reduced use as a success, and clients can sometimes graduate without 
being entirely drug-free.”184  
Although court-mandated treatment may be “successful at turning 
addicts into drug free, productive citizens,”185 such mandated treatment 
imposes unreasonable burdens on the non-addicted offender.186 Drug 
courts and similar programs use “the coercive powers of the courts to 
mandate treatment” for drug offenders (even those charged with minor 
offenses).187 Such programs present to the non-addicted defendant 
charged with a minor drug offense the option to choose the lesser of two 
evils: either undergo court-mandated treatment that is designed to treat 
addiction, or opt for regular court proceedings and risk criminal 
conviction and punishment.188 The non-addicted defendant will probably 
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 182. Id. 
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4–7 (illustrating the coercive powers of the criminal justice system to mandate treatment 
for a minor drug offense through a hypothetical conversation between attorney and 
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at 750 (arguing that drug courts provide defendants with “a true choice between 
therapeutic court enrollment and regular case processing”). 
752 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.3 
 
prefer to be placed into the court-mandated treatment in order to avoid 
criminal sanctions.189 The non-addict then forfeits some of his or her 
rights in order to comply with the treatment program by submitting to 
judicial supervision, frequent drug testing, and regular attendance at 
treatment sessions.190 In the U.S., the right to consume alcohol is often 
forfeited as well.191 
Portugal has avoided many of the problems facing other criminal 
justice systems in implementing an effective drug policy since it enacted 
Decreto-Lei 30/2000. Police are not permitted to make an arrest for use 
or possession of drugs for personal consumption under Portugal’s drug 
policy, but they can confiscate the drugs and refer the drug user to a 
Dissuasion Committee.192 This practice has the benefit of preventing a 
drug abuser from going through the “traumatic event” of an arrest.193 In 
Portugal, removing the power to arrest for minor drug offenses improved 
addicts’ access to drug treatment because “[t]he most substantial barrier 
to offering treatment to the addict population was the addicts’ fear of 
arrest.”194 Additionally, the elimination of the requirement for minor drug 
offenses to be tried in a criminal court also alleviated the fears of addicts 
who wished to seek treatment.195 The alleviation of addicts’ fears led to 
an increase in the willingness of drug abusers to seek treatment,196 which 
may explain the reduction in drug-related deaths in Portugal.197 These 
positive results may lead policymakers in other countries to conclude that 
a decriminalization model can be a “more humane and effective 
response[] to drug users.”198 
Policymakers wishing to provide sufficient treatment services for drug 
offenders as an alternative to incarceration may also see Portugal’s 
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 190. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 167 (providing a guide to 
how treatment programs are conducted through U.S. drug treatment courts). 
 191. See id. at 11. 
 192. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 113, at 2. 
 193. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 167, at 5. 
 194. GREENWALD, supra note 84, at 8. 
 195. Id. at 8–9. 
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decriminalization model a more efficient option than those that can be 
provided through criminal justice systems.199 Because the determination 
of whether to refer an offender to treatment is made by a three-person 
committee that includes at least two professionals with expertise in drug 
addiction,200 resources are better focused on providing treatment for those 
who can actually benefit from it.201 On the other hand, alternative 
approaches through criminal justice systems, such as drug courts, which 
offer treatment in place of punishment on the basis of the offender’s 
consent rather than a determination by experts, can lead to courts 
“requiring extensive treatment programs for those that may least need 
it.”202 The efficiency of Portugal’s decriminalization model is also 
demonstrated through the Dissuasion Committees’ ability to resolve 
cases quickly.203 
The WHO recently made headlines by coming out in support of 
decriminalization policies.204 In a report released July 2014, the WHO 
stated that “[c]ountries should work toward developing policies and laws 
that decriminalize injection and other use of drugs and, thereby, reduce 
incarceration.”205 The report also noted Portugal’s success with 
decriminalization.206 
  
 199. See Alex Kreit, The Decriminalization Option: Should States Consider 
Moving from a Criminal to a Civil Drug Court Model?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 299, 325–
35 (2010) (comparing Portugal’s drug policy with U.S. drug courts). 
 200. Russoniello, supra note 19, at 386; Decreto-Lei 30/2000, supra note 20, art. 
7. 
 201. See GREENWALD, supra note 84, at 10. 
 202. Miller, supra note 186, at 1575. 
 203. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 113, at 3 (“Whereas prior to the establishment 
of the CDTs a process might take up to two years to reach court, decisions are now 
typically made within four to five weeks, and all but the most complex cases are 
reviewed by the Commission within three months.”). 
 204. See Matt Ferner, World Health Organization Calls for Decriminalizing 
Personal Drug Use, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/23/who-drug-decriminalization_n_5606609. 
html; T.W., The WHO Calls for Decriminalisation, ECONOMIST (July 17, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2014/07/illicit-drugs. 
 205. WORLD HEALTH ORG., CONSOLIDATED GUIDELINES ON HIV PREVENTION, 
DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND CARE FOR KEY POPULATIONS 91 (2014). 
 206. Id. at 92. 
754 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.3 
 
The Portuguese decriminalization model has been extensively 
discussed here because its accomplishments establish it as a prime 
example for why international law should allow countries to consider 
decriminalizing minor drug offenses. The success of Portugal’s drug 
policy is dependent on the removal of criminal prosecution for the use or 
possession of drugs for personal consumption.207 Greenwald suggests in 
his 2009 report, “[b]etween (a) addicts who are afraid to seek treatment 
due to fear of criminal penalties and (b) addicts who freely seek 
treatment in a decriminalized framework, the latter option is clearly 
preferable.”208 As an increasing number of countries take steps towards 
decriminalization,209 and with the WHO now endorsing decriminalization 
efforts, it seems that decriminalization is becoming accepted as sound 
policy with the international community. 
B. Is Decriminalization Permitted Under Current International 
Law? 
Portugal is a Party to all three of the UN Drug Conventions.210 Under 
Decreto-Lei 30/2000, the simple consumption, acquisition, and 
possession of drugs for personal use are no longer criminal offenses, as 
the law describes such actions as only constituting administrative 
offenses.211 However, decriminalization of drug possession seems to 
violate the plain language of article 3(2) of the 1988 Convention, which 
states, “each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to 
establish as a criminal offence . . . the possession, purchase or cultivation 
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of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption . . 
. .”212  
While Portuguese officials were crafting Decreto-Lei 30/2000, they 
were aware that tensions might arise between the decriminalization of 
use and possession of drugs for personal use and the country’s treaty 
obligations.213 Thus, they were careful to craft the new drug policy in a 
manner that they believed conformed to the UN Drug Conventions.214 
The Portuguese officials believed that replacing the existing criminal 
sanctions for minor drug offenses with administrative regulations 
satisfied the treaty obligations.215 
The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which is the body 
tasked with monitoring the Parties’ compliance with the UN Drug 
Conventions,216 did not hold the same view as the Portuguese officials 
towards decriminalization at that time.217 In a report published in 2000, 
the INCB alleged that removing criminal sanctions for possession of 
drugs was “not in line with the international drug control treaties.”218 
After Decreto-Lei 30/2000 became effective in 2001, the INCB criticized 
Portugal’s policy in its annual report, and reiterated that the 1988 
Convention requires possession to be a criminal offense under the 
Parties’ domestic law.219 
In 2004, the INCB’s opposition seemed to soften.220 In April of 2004, 
the INCB sent a mission to visit Portugal and examine the country’s drug 
policy.221 The INCB “examined the legal framework” of Decreto-Lei 
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30/2000, and “noted that the acquisition, possession and abuse of drugs 
had remained prohibited.”222 In its annual report for 2004, the INCB 
proclaimed, “the practice of exempting small quantities of drugs from 
criminal prosecution is consistent with the international drug control 
treaties.”223 Despite the more positive view of Portugal’s drug policy, the 
INCB seemed to remain a little skeptical by “call[ing] on the 
Government of Portugal to examine ways in which the commissions for 
the dissuasion of drug abuse can contribute towards preventing drug 
abuse.”224 
The INCB sent another mission to Portugal in 2012 to evaluate the 
country’s compliance with the treaty obligations.225 The INCB’s annual 
report for that year fully embraced Portugal’s drug policy.226 It 
acknowledged that Portugal’s “drug control strategy is clearly defined 
and is implemented through a comprehensive national plan,” and “[t]he 
Government regularly evaluates the effectiveness of its drug control 
efforts.”227 The INCB’s report also concluded that Portugal is “fully 
committed to the objectives of [the drug control] treaties.”228 Therefore, 
the INCB accepted Portugal’s drug policy as being in compliance with 
the UN Drug Conventions. 
C. Should Article 3 of the 1988 Convention be Amended? 
The INCB’s acceptance of Portugal’s drug policy in the 2012 report 
seems to indicate that Parties to the UN Drug Conventions may 
implement certain decriminalization measures without violating 
international law. Nevertheless, approving decriminalization under the 
current legal framework relies on legal loopholes in the Conventions.229 
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Moreover, the INCB has been inconsistent in its approval of 
decriminalization of drug possession for personal use.230 Portugal is not 
the only country to be affected by this inconsistency.231 As more 
countries are considering decriminalization,232 it is becoming 
increasingly important that international law takes a clear and consistent 
stance towards such policies.  
In order to clear up the confusion surrounding the legality of 
decriminalization under international law, an amendment to article 3(2) 
of the 1988 Convention should be proposed. Under article 31 of the 1988 
Convention, any Party may propose an amendment.233 The Secretary-
General will then communicate the text of the proposed amendment to 
the other Parties and “ask them whether they accept the proposed 
amendment.”234 If no Party rejects the amendment within two years, then 
the amendment is “deemed to have been accepted and shall enter into 
force” with respect to a Party ninety days after that Party has expressed 
its consent to be bound by the amendment.235 If any Party rejects the 
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proposed amendment, then “the Secretary-General shall consult with the 
Parties and, if a majority so requests,”236 the Economic and Social 
Council of the UN may call a conference to discuss the matter.237 “Any 
amendment resulting from such a conference shall be embodied in a 
Protocol of Amendment”238 and become binding on a country upon its 
expressed consent.239 
For the sake of clarifying the legal status of decriminalization of 
possession for personal consumption under the 1988 Convention, only a 
minor change in the language of article 3(2) is needed. For example, the 
word “shall” could be replaced with “may,” which would cause the 
provision to read, “Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic 
concepts of its legal system, each Party may adopt such measures as may 
be necessary to establish as a criminal offence . . . .”240  
Another option, which may be more in line with the purpose of the 
conventions, is to replace the words “establish as a criminal offence” 
with merely the word “prohibit.” The provision would thus read, “each 
Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to prohibit under its 
domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or 
cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal 
consumption . . . .” This language would accomplish the objective of 
prohibiting the possession and consumption of drugs for non-medical or 
non-scientific purposes, while simultaneously giving countries 
considerable discretion in determining how to handle minor drug 
offenses. 
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CONCLUSION 
Portugal is not the only country to decriminalize minor drug 
offenses,241 but its significant and continuing success with 
decriminalization stands as a strong testament for why international law 
should permit countries to move away from the criminalization of minor 
drug offenses. “Contrary to predictions, major increases in drug use did 
not take place; instead, evidence indicated reductions in problematic use, 
drug-related harms and overcrowding of the criminal justice system.”242 
On the other hand, the prevailing strategy of criminalizing drug 
possession has been ineffective, as arrests continue to increase without 
there being any significant impact on the prevalence of drug use.243 
Although some jurisdictions provide treatment programs through their 
criminal justice systems as an alternative to criminal sanctions,244 the 
efficiency and effectiveness of such policies suffer from problems arising 
out of their administration by criminal courts.245 Portugal’s drug scheme 
demonstrates that institutions outside of the traditional criminal justice 
system may be able to handle cases of minor drug offenses more 
effectively.246 
However, whether decriminalization of minor drug offenses is 
permitted under international law, remains unclear. The INCB’s approval 
of decriminalization policies has been inconsistent,247 and different 
interpretations of the UN Drug Conventions have led to opposite 
conclusions.248 In the face of this uncertainty, calls for decriminalization 
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continue to increase as more people recognize the failures of the 
prohibitionist approach.249 There is now growing consideration among 
national governments and international bodies for drug policy reform.250 
International law should allow governments more freedom to pursue 
effective drug policies, including decriminalization of minor drug 
offenses; and the text of the 1988 Convention should be amended in 
order to clearly permit such policies. 
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